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Abstract
Several recent papers show that increases in the capital stock at one multinational
aﬃliate tend to raise the capital stock at other locations, rather than to reduce
it. In this paper, we theoretically and empirically explore the consequences of
these ﬁndings for national corporate tax policy. Our main hypothesis is that
domestic corporate taxation not only reduces domestic capital investment but
also lowers capital stocks at foreign aﬃliates within a multinational group. The
paper identiﬁes several channels through which domestic taxation may exert such a
cross-border eﬀect on foreign capital. Using micro data on European multinational
ﬁrms, we conﬁrm the hypothesis showing that a ten percentage point increase
in corporate tax rates is associated with a 5.5 percent decrease in the aﬃliate’s
capital stock. From a welfare point of view, this cross-border tax eﬀect on capital
investment gives rise to a negative ﬁscal externality of corporate taxation which is
empirically shown to compensate a substantial fraction of the well-known positive
proﬁt shifting externality.
JEL Codes: H25, F23
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1 Introduction
Recent empirical studies suggest that foreign investment of a multinational enter-
prise (MNE) does not reduce its domestic investment activity, it rather boosts it.
Several papers demonstrate that an increase in foreign investment causes domestic
investment to rise. These ﬁndings stand in sharp contrast to the standard model of
tax competition which is based on the idea that foreign investment substitutes for
domestic investment. The new empirical evidence instead suggests that if foreign
taxes decrease foreign investment, they will consequently reduce domestic invest-
ment, too. To be precise, we expect taxes in one country to reduce the MNE’s
capital stocks at all locations. In the empirical public ﬁnance literature, these
cross-border tax eﬀects have been neglected so far.
In this paper, we identify diﬀerent channels of cross-border tax eﬀects on multi-
national investment, quantify them empirically and outline potential welfare im-
plications. As a ﬁrst step, we build a theoretical model to explain how taxes in
one country aﬀect investment in another country. Precisely, we consider tax rate
changes at the MNE’s headquarter location and investigate their eﬀect on a for-
eign aﬃliate’s capital investment. The second step is to empirically measure these
cross-border tax eﬀects on aﬃliate investment for a large panel of European MNEs
and to test for the model predictions. As a third and ﬁnal step, we explore some
of the welfare implications. We show empirically that the ﬁscal externality caused
by proﬁt shifting behavior is considerably reduced if cross-border tax eﬀects on
aﬃliate capital stocks are taken into account.
In the standard literature on international investment, foreign investment is
expected to substitute for domestic investment. Using aggregate investment data,
Feldstein (1995) provides evidence that foreign investment replaces domestic in-
vestment “dollar for dollar”. The tax competition literature rests on equivalent
assumptions, see e.g. Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986). Under perfect capital mo-
bility, domestic taxes lower the domestic return to investment and drive capital
out of the country. The interest rate falls which makes foreign capital stocks in-
crease. Thus, national tax policies have positive externalities on other countries’
tax revenue, which leads to ineﬃciently low tax rates in equilibrium.
Recent studies have challenged this view. Feldstein’s (1995) ﬁnding is replicated
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in Desai et al. (2005a) with respect to aggregate data, but the authors also ﬁnd that
US multinationals increase their domestic capital stock in response to investment
abroad. In Desai et al. (2005b), they use ﬁrm-level data of US multinationals and
show that foreign investment in plant, property and equipment (PPE) is associated
with higher domestic PPE investment. Similarly, Egger and Pfaﬀermayr (2003)
ﬁnd that foreign investment increases domestic investment in tangible assets and
does not decrease investment in intangibles. Castellani and Barba Navaretti (2004)
and Jaeckle (2006) show that going abroad increases domestic productivity and
competitiveness.1
An important implication of these empirical contributions is that the standard
model of tax competition obviously misses some important aspects of international
investment. Speciﬁcally, it cannot reproduce the empirically observed pattern that
investment increases at one location cause investment at other aﬃliates to rise. The
crucial question is what are potential driving forces behind this positive correlation
and how do they relate to corporate taxation. In this paper, we consider three
mechanisms. Firstly, following Nielsen et al. (2004), multinational ﬁrms may be
assumed to use common inputs (e.g. marketing, trademarks, patents etc.) which
increase the productivity of capital at all aﬃliates. The return of this input is
generated at all of the MNE’s locations. If taxes reduce the return of the common
input at one of the aﬃliates, then real capital investment decreases at all aﬃliates.
Secondly, if a multinational ﬁrm is credit constrained and has to ﬁnance new
investment out of its own funds, increasing domestic taxes may reduce the available
funds and therefore reduce foreign investment as well as domestic investment.
Thirdly, following Grubert and Slemrod (1998), the cost of manipulating transfer
prices may be related to a subsidiary’s size of the capital stock. For example, large
subsidiary capital stocks may ’legitimize’ large trade ﬂows between a subsidiary
1Lipsey (1995) analyzes a cross-section of American multinational ﬁrms, reporting a mild pos-
itive correlation between foreign production and domestic employment levels. Stevens and Lipsey
(1992) analyze the investment behavior of seven multinational ﬁrms, concluding that investments
in diﬀerent locations substitute for each other due to costly external ﬁnancing. Devereux and
Freeman (1995) come to a diﬀerent conclusion in their study of bilateral ﬂows of aggregate in-
vestment funds between seven OECD countries, ﬁnding no evidence of tax-induced substitution
between domestic and foreign investment. Desai et al. (2006) ask whether investment in tax
havens diverts activity from non-havens and ﬁnd that non-haven activity rises in response to tax
haven investment activity.
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and its parent (or other group aﬃliates respectively) which facilitates proﬁt shifting
behavior via transfer price distortions. Since changes in the domestic tax rate
impact on the incentive to engage in proﬁt shifting, they are predicted to aﬀect
the size of the foreign subsidiary’s capital stock.
The central hypothesis derived from the theoretical model is that capital invest-
ment of multinational aﬃliates may decrease in the tax rate at foreign locations.
Our estimation results support this prediction. Using a large set of European
multinationals from the AMADEUS database, we regress the multinational aﬃli-
ate’s capital investment on the corporate tax rates at the subsidiary and the parent
country and derive a robust negative relationship between both tax measures and
the subsidiary’s capital investment. Quantitatively, an increase in the foreign par-
ent tax rate by 10 percentage points is estimated to reduce capital investment at
the subsidiary level by 5.5%. Moreover, in line with our theoretical presumptions,
the eﬀect turns out to be especially prevalent if, ﬁrstly, the multinational head-
quarter owns intangible property and, hence, the use of common input goods tends
to be important for the multinational ﬁrm and, secondly, if the MNE is small and
earns low proﬁts and is therefore most likely to be credit constrained, see Fazzari et
al. (1988). Lastly, we also ﬁnd evidence that investment at corporate subsidiaries
tends to rise in the MNE’s proﬁt shifting opportunities.
The existence of a negative cross-border tax eﬀect on aﬃliate investment may
have important implications for the thinking about international tax issues. The
standard model ignores these cross–border eﬀects and focuses on direct tax eﬀects
instead (for a recent survey of empirical studies, see Devereux, 2007). More re-
cent studies concentrate on proﬁt shifting activities within multinational ﬁrms and
ﬁnd quantitatively sizable eﬀects.2 These suggest that corporate taxation exerts
a positive ﬁscal externality on the tax revenue and welfare of foreign countries
which means that corporate taxes are set ineﬃciently low from a worldwide wel-
fare perspective. Our cross-border investment eﬀect obviously runs counter to
this well-established positive externality due to proﬁt shifting.3 In other words,
domestic taxes ceteris paribus increase foreign tax revenue and consequently for-
2See e.g. Hines and Rice (1994), Clausing (2003), Weichenrieder (2007), Buettner and Wamser
(2007), Huizinga and Laeven (2008).
3The issue is explored in depth in a companion paper, see Becker and Riedel (2007).
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eign welfare because reported foreign proﬁts increase due to shifting activities but,
at the same time, they ceteris paribus reduce foreign tax revenue because foreign
investment is deterred. The question arises which of the two eﬀects prevails. We
empirically quantify the externalities and ﬁnd that the proﬁt shifting eﬀect dom-
inates. However, the negative investment externality is shown to compensate a
substantial part of the proﬁt shifting eﬀect and thus is suggested to bring the
economies closer to the eﬃcient solution.
Besides the contribution to the literature on capital taxes and tax competi-
tion, our paper also adds to the work on investment activities within multinational
ﬁrms, precisely to the question whether foreign and domestic investment levels are
complements or substitutes. By using tax reforms, our approach provides a new
solution to the often discussed endogeneity problem (see e.g. Desai et al. 2005b)
that a simultaneous increase in foreign and domestic activity may be driven by
unobservable factors like a new invention, a productivity shock etc. Since tax rate
changes can be considered exogenous from the individual ﬁrm’s point of view, our
estimations provide additional evidence for the existence of a complementary rela-
tion between investment levels at diﬀerent multinational locations without being
exposed to the same methodological problems as previous studies (although there
may be others).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section outlines
the theoretical model that underlies our analysis. Section 3 presents the estimation
methodology. In section 4, we describe the data, provide descriptive statistics and
report the results. Section 5 discusses some implications and concludes.
2 Model and hypotheses
2.1 Model setup
Consider a world with a large number of countries, among which there is a subset
of two countries j = A,B linked through multinational ﬁrm structures. The
representative multinational enterprise (MNE) is headquartered in country A and
runs a subsidiary in country B. It produces a single good at both of its locations
using capital (KA,KB) and a common input S. Capital can be rented at rate
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R from the world capital market. For simplicity reasons, we assume that the
considered countries are small compared to the rest of the world and consequently,
corporate tax rate changes do not aﬀect the worldwide interest rate R.4 The
production technology in both locations is assumed to be the same5: F (KA, S)
and F (KB, S), with F1, F2 > 0 > F11, F22.
6 Furthermore, we assume that the
common input increases capital productivity and vice versa: F12, F21 > 0. The
input is common in the sense that the parent ﬁrm’s use of it does not diminish its
use by the aﬃliate, and vice versa. The world market for ﬁnal goods is perfectly
competitive, and changes in the MNE’s output do not aﬀect the world market
price which is normalized to unity.
The headquarter produces the common input at a production price of 2 per
unit. It charges a fee G to the aﬃliate. Tax authorities in both countries believe
that a fair price is given by G = 1. However, since the arm’s length price for the
common input is hard to observe by national tax authorities, G may deviate from
1. Thus, the MNE can strategically make use of transfer pricing for tax planning
reasons. In line with previous papers, e.g. Hauﬂer and Schjelderup (2000), Nielsen
et al. (2004), we assume that proﬁt shifting activities incur concealment costs C
which convexly increase in the deviation of the transfer price G from its true price
1 and which may depend on the aﬃliate’s capital stock (which is clariﬁed later
on).7 Formally, we deﬁne the concealment cost function C = C(G − 1, KB) with
C(0) = 0, sign C1 = sign (G− 1) and C11 > 0.
Consequently, the MNE’s total after-tax proﬁts are given by
Π = (1− tA) (F (KA, S)− (2−G)S) + (1− tB) (F (KB, S)−GS)
−R (KA + KB)− C (G− 1 , KB)S, (1)
with tA and tB representing the national corporate tax rates. Note that, whereas
capital expenditures are not deductible from the tax base, the cost for the common
4The implications for empirical analysis will be discussed below.
5The results will not depend on this assumption which is mainly made for presentational ease.
6The subscripts denote derivatives to the ﬁrst and second argument of the production function,
e.g. FA1 ≡ ∂F∂KA and FA12 ≡ ∂
2F
∂KA∂S
.
7Note that, due to the public good character of the common input, it is hard to determine the
economically “true” charge. From the point of view of the MNE, it is only important, though,
that it cannot set arbitrary levels of G without bearing concealment costs.
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input good can be deducted. Note further, that for G = 1, the tax deductions for
the common good S are equal in both locations.
Proﬁt maximization implies that the MNE chooses KA, KB, S and G such that
the partial derivatives are zero: ΠKA = 0, ΠKB = 0, ΠS = 0 and ΠG = 0. This set
of ﬁrst-order conditions implicitly deﬁnes the equilibrium quantities as functions
of the exogeneously given parameters: KA = KA (tA, tB, R), KB = KB (tA, tB, R),
S = S (tA, tB, R) and G = G (tA, tB, R).
In the following, we will consider the experiment of a tax rate change in country
A. We are mainly interested in the cross-border eﬀect of the tax policy change on
investment behavior of the multinational aﬃliate in B, i.e. in dKB/dtA.
2.2 Cross-border tax eﬀects
How do tax changes in country A aﬀect aﬃliate investment in B? The most basic
eﬀect is the interest rate externality, as highlighted, among others, by Zodrow
and Mieszkowski (1986). A tax rate increase in A reduces capital demand in A,
which depresses the interest rate. As a consequence, capital investment in B rises.
However, due to the assumption of a large world capital market, this eﬀect does not
occur in our model (the implications for the empirical work are discussed below).
Beside the standard externality via the interest rate channel, additional po-
tential linkages between taxes and aﬃliate investment arise. We ﬁnd it helpful to
summarize them in three scenarios which are, for expositional reasons, based on
diﬀerent sets of assumptions. In each of these scenarios, the eﬀect of a marginal
increase of tA on capital stocks KA and KB is considered.
The ﬁrst scenario follows the analysis in Nielsen et al. (2004), where it is
assumed that MNEs are characterized by the use of common input goods, like
patents, trademarks or management services. The common input is assumed to be
a public good within the ﬁrm, i.e. the input used in one location does not prevent
its use in another location. The scenario can be summarized by the following
Hypothesis 1 (Common input): Assume that the ﬁrm chooses KA, KB and S
optimally and that there are no proﬁt shifting opportunities, G = 1. Then a
corporate tax increase at the headquarter location reduces capital investment
at the subsidiary level.
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Proﬁt maximizing behaviour is implied by the following ﬁrst-order conditions:
∂Π
∂Kj
= (1− tj)F j1 −R = 0 for j = A,B, (2)
∂Π
∂S
= (1− tA)
(
FA2 − 1
)
+ (1− tB)
(
FB2 − 1
)
= 0. (3)
Now consider an increase in the corporate tax rate of country A. It can easily be
shown that a rise in tA has a negative impact on capital investment in country A,
as expected, and thus, dKA/dtA < 0. How does the aﬃliate in country B react to
a change in the tax rate tA? We derive that
dKB =
FB12F
A
21F
A
1 − FB12FA11
(
FA2 − 1
)
FB11 (F
A
11F
A
22 − FA21FA12) (1− tA) + FA11 (FB11FB22 − FB12FB21) (1− tB)
dtA. (4)
The denominator is unambiguously negative. The ﬁrst term in the numerator is
positive, and the second is zero if tax rates are equal, see (3). In this case, an
increase in tA decreases aﬃliate investment,
dKB
dtA
< 0.8 The intuition behind the
result is the following: The larger the ﬁrm’s overall capital stock, the more produc-
tive is the common input. If corporate taxes in A depress the parent company’s
capital stock, the common input is reduced as well, which negatively aﬀects the
size of the aﬃliate capital stock in country B.
Scenario 2 is characterized by the assumption that investors are credit con-
strained. This implies that taxes may determine the allocation of capital across
diﬀerent locations but may also aﬀect the available funds and thus the size of the
ﬁrm’s overall stock of capital. This scenario can be summarized as follows:
Hypothesis 2 (Credit constraints): Assume that the MNE neither decides on
S, i.e. S = S¯, nor on G, i.e. G = 1. It observes retained earnings of E
from previous periods and has no access to the world capital market. Then,
an increase in the corporate tax rate at the parent location may lead to a
reduction or increase in subsidiary capital investment.
Retained earnings at the parent ﬁrm in country A are taxed at the domestic rate
8If tax rates diﬀer much, some interferences with the deductibility of the common input occur.
Then, the second term in the numerator can take positive and negative values. For purpose of
illustration, we abstract from this eﬀect.
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tA. These funds are invested in the headquarter and the aﬃliate’s capital stocks,
KA and KB, or, alternatively, in the world capital market at the interest rate R.
An eﬀective credit constraint is given if FA1 (1− tA) > R and FB1 (1− tB) > R
which implies that no capital is invested in world market bonds and hence
(1− tA)E = KA + KB. (5)
The optimal choices of KA and KB are implied by
(1− tA)FA1 = (1− tB)FB1 . (6)
Now, we again consider the eﬀect of a change in the corporate tax rate of country A,
tA, on capital investment. A comparative static analysis with respect to equations
(5) and (6) yields the following eﬀects of tA on capital investment in the parent
company and the aﬃliate:
dKA =
FA1 − (1− tB)EFB11
(1− tA)FA11 + (1− tB)FB11
dtA < 0, (7)
dKB =
−FA1 − (1− tB)EFB11
(1− tA)FA11 + (1− tB)FB11
dtA ≶ 0. (8)
The sign of equation (7) is unambiguously negative indicating that a rise in the
tax rate tA lowers capital investment at the parent ﬁrm. This result is driven by
two eﬀects: The ﬁrst term in the numerator can be interpreted as the substitution
eﬀect; an increasing tax rate shifts production from A to B. The second term can
be interpreted as the income eﬀect: The tax rate increase reduces available funds
and thus reduces investment in both countries. Both eﬀects lead to reduced capital
investment in country A. The eﬀect of tax rate changes in A on capital investment
in B, as given by equation (8), is ambiguous in turn. Here, the substitution eﬀect
tends to increase investment at the aﬃliate in B while the income eﬀect reduces
available funds and thus also reduces investment in country B.
The third scenario captures the idea that ﬁrms increase their subsidiary in-
vestment to facilitate proﬁt shifting activities between multinational locations, see
e.g. Grubert and Slemrod (1998). The underlying rationale is that high capital
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stocks justify large trade interactions between the aﬃliates that give rise to proﬁt
shifting possibilities via the distortion of intra-ﬁrm transfer prices. The scenario
can be summarized in
Hypothesis 3 (Proﬁt shifting): Assume that the MNE does not decide on S,
i.e. S = S¯. Concealment costs C = C (G− 1, KB) are convex in the level
of proﬁt shifting, i.e. sign C1 = sign(tB − tA) and C11 > 0. Furthermore,
concealment costs depend negatively on the size of the aﬃliate’s capital stock,
i.e. C2 < 0 < C22. Cross-derivatives are given by: sign C12 = sign(tA− tB),
sign C21 = sign(tA − tB).9 Then, an increase in the absolute corporate tax
rate diﬀerential between the two locations increases subsidiary investment.
Diﬀerentiating (1) with respect to KA, KB and G under the assumptions of
Hypothesis 3 yields
∂Π
∂KA
= (1− tA)FA1 −R = 0, (9)
∂Π
∂KB
= (1− tB)FB1 −R − C2S¯ = 0, (10)
∂Π
∂G
= (tB − tA)− C1 = 0. (11)
The level of proﬁt shifting is determined by equation (11) which equates the mar-
ginal gain from shifting one unit of proﬁts, tB − tA, to the marginal shifting cost
C1. If tB > tA then proﬁt is shifted from country B to country A which implies
G > 1, and vice versa. Moreover, it follows from equation (11) that the larger the
absolute tax rate diﬀerential between countries A and B, the larger is the proﬁt
shifting volume.
Again, we consider the eﬀect of a marginal increase of tA. It is straightforward
to show that dKA/dtA < 0. Moreover, tA impacts on KB by aﬀecting the tax rate
diﬀerential between the entities and hence, the MNE’s proﬁt shifting incentive.
9The assumption on cross-derivatives reﬂects that a marginal increase in the aﬃliate’s capital
stock lowers the marginal proﬁt shifting costs. Similarly, the marginal eﬀect of an increase in the
capital stock on concealment cost is larger, the larger the level of proﬁt shifting. An example of
such a concealment cost function is C = (G− 1)2/KB.
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Formally, the eﬀect on the size of the aﬃliate B’s capital stock is given by:
dKB =
C21S¯
C11 · FB11 (1− tB)− (C11C22 − C12C21)S¯
d (tB − tA) . (12)
With C11, C22 > 0 and C22C11 > C12C21, the denominator is unambiguously
negative. In order to interpret equation (12), we have to diﬀerentiate between two
cases. If country B is the high-tax country, i.e. tB > tA, an increase in tA decreases
the absolute tax rate diﬀerential between the aﬃliates. As a consequence, less
proﬁts are shifted and, with C21 < 0, the aﬃliate’s capital stock KB is decreased.
However, if country B is the low-tax country, i.e. tB < tA, an increase in tA
widens the absolute tax diﬀerential and increases the level of proﬁt shifting. With
C21 > 0, investment in the aﬃliate’s capital stock KB rises. Taken together, we
can conclude that the capital investment at aﬃliate B is predicted to positively
depend on the the absolute tax rate diﬀerential between the locations.
2.3 Implications for tax competition
In the previous section, we identiﬁed several channels through which corporate
taxes may exert a cross-border eﬀect on foreign investment. Hypothesis 1 predicts
the eﬀect to be unambiguously negative whereas hypotheses 2 and 3 suggest a
potentially negative relation. In the following, we will determine the implication
of this ﬁnding for international tax competition and worldwide welfare.
In the standard model of corporate tax competition and multinational ﬁrms,
domestic tax policy exerts a positive ﬁscal externality on the foreign country’s tax
revenue. A tax rate increase enhances the proﬁt that the multinational ﬁrm shifts
to the foreign location and, thus, raises foreign corporate tax revenues. In the
tax competition equilibrium, this externality translates into ineﬃciently low cor-
porate taxes. However, in the previous section, we also identiﬁed various channels
through which corporate taxation may exert a negative impact on foreign invest-
ment levels. These cross-border eﬀects give rise to a negative ﬁscal externality
and ineﬃciently high tax rates. Consequently, the question arises which of these
externalities prevails.
To investigate that in a formal framework, consider the eﬀect of an increase
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of tA on the tax revenue in country B, denoted by RB, which is given by RB =
tB ·(FB−GS), see equation (1). Assuming multinational proﬁt shifting possibilities
and cross-border tax eﬀects on capital investment, the externality of corporate tax
setting in A on tax revenue in country B is derived as
∂RB
∂tA
= tB · ∂(F
B −GS)
∂tA
= tB
[
−S ∂G
∂tA
+ FB1
∂KB
∂tA
]
. (13)
The ﬁrst term in square brackets captures the direct eﬀect of tA on the level
of proﬁt shifting, ∂G/∂tA < 0, which follows from equation (11). Note that the
direction and volume of proﬁt shifting is critically determined by the tax rate
diﬀerential between the locations as clariﬁed by equation (11). The second term
captures the cross border tax eﬀect on aﬃliate investment. In accordance with
the previous section, each of the three channels can be the driving force behind
∂KB/∂tA < 0. Thus, equation (13) captures two ﬁscal externalities, a positive
externality due to proﬁt shifting and a negative externality due to cross-border
tax eﬀects on aﬃliate investment. The sign of the sum of these two externalities
is crucial for the welfare implications of tax competition. Equation (13) does not
provide a clear-cut answer to the question which of the two externalities prevails.
Therefore, empirical work is needed to quantify the two eﬀects. Among other
aspects, this will be addressed in the subsequent sections.
2.4 From theory to empirical analysis
In section 2.2 we identiﬁed four channels through which taxes in A may aﬀect
investment in B: the interest rate externality, common inputs (scenario 1), credit
constraints (scenario 2) and proﬁt shifting (scenario 3). Whereas the interest
rate channel aﬀects all ﬁrms in country B, not only those owned by parents in
country A but also those owned by parents who reside in other countries, the
three remaining channels are based on the speciﬁc relationship between the parent
company and the aﬃliate. This setting allows for identifying the role of common
ownership by comparing the behavior of aﬃliates owned by parents in A to the
behavior of aﬃliates owned by parents in other countries. In the context of our
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empirical model, the former represent the treatment group while the latter serve
as the control group. This structure has the advantage that the subsidiaries are
located in the same country B and only diﬀer in exposure to tax policy changes at
their parent location. In the empirical framework, we control for country-year ﬁxed
eﬀects and consequently for the impact of unobserved policy changes in country
B on subsidiary capital investment and may still identify the eﬀects of corporate
tax rate changes at the parent location on the subsidiary’s investment level. The
country-year ﬁxed eﬀect also captures potential policy-driven interest rate changes
which are equal for all ﬁrms.
How do we distinguish between the channels described in scenarios 1 to 3?
Unfortunately, the theory does not provide clear-cut criteria to separate the speciﬁc
scenarios from each other. However, we can deﬁne groups of ﬁrms which we
consider to be characterized by common input issues, credit constraints or proﬁt
shifting. In scenario 1 (common inputs), we consider ﬁrms with stocks of intangible
assets since common inputs are mostly intangible in nature (e.g. patents). With
regards to scenario 2 (credit constraints), previous studies suggest that credit
constraints are most likely a good description for ﬁrms which are small and have
low proﬁts. In addition, by controlling for the absolute tax rate diﬀerential we can
capture the role of proﬁt shifting (scenario 3). Although not providing us with
a thorough test with which we can fully separate the individual impact–channels
from one another, this may suﬃce to get an idea about what happens.
3 Estimation methodology
The previous sections suggest that the capital stock of subsidiary i at time t
depends on the host country’s corporate tax rate, τi,t, as well as on the corporate
tax rate at the foreign headquarter location, τhi,t. Hypotheses 1, 2 and 3 oﬀer
alternative explanations why τhi,t may exert a negative impact on the aﬃliate’s
capital stock, ki,t. In addition, Hypothesis 3 can be tested precisely by regressing
capital investment on the absolute diﬀerence between the subsidiary and parent
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tax |τi,t − τhi,t|. Our estimation approach is described by the following equation
Δ log ki,t = β1Δ log ki,t−1 + β2Δτi,t + β3Δτhi,t + β4Δ |τi,t − τhi,t|
+β5xi,t + β6Δxhi,t + Δμt + Δi,t (14)
where we expect β2, β3 < 0 and β4 > 0, according to the theory. We made several
choices on estimation methodology which are discussed in turn.
Since the distribution of ﬁxed assets is rather skewed, we employ the logarithm
of ﬁxed assets as the endogeneous variable. To control for time-constant sub-
sidiary, country and parent characteristics, we employ a ﬁrst-diﬀerence approach.
(Δ denotes the ﬁrst diﬀerence of a variable).10 Moreover, we include a full set
of year dummies μt to control for time-varying eﬀects which are common to all
subsidiaries in our data set, e.g. changes in the world market interest rate over
time. Additionally, we include time-varying locational and industry characteristics
xi,t, as well as time-varying characteristics of the parent country xhi,t. Moreover,
we add country-year ﬁxed eﬀects that fully absorb the impact of policy variable
changes at the subsidiary location. This implies that the eﬀect of the host country
tax rate on capital investment cannot be identiﬁed separately, but we still may
determine the eﬀect of the parent tax on subsidiary capital. Hence, we compare
capital investment of subsidiaries in the same country that only diﬀer in (the tax
policy at) their parent’s location (see also section 2.4).
Since changes in the subsidiary’s capital investment are likely associated with
relevant adjustment costs, it is reasonable to employ a dynamic panel estimation
approach that takes into account that subsidiary capital investment today is de-
termined by the level of subsidiary capital investment in the previous period ki,t−1.
We use a General Method of Moments (GMM) approach which is a generaliza-
10Since we employ panel data that is available for more than two time periods, it is not equiv-
alent to apply a ﬁxed eﬀect and ﬁrst-diﬀerencing approach to control for unobserved subsidiary
heterogeneity. Both models give unbiased and consistent estimates although the relative eﬃ-
ciency of the estimators may diﬀer, depending on the model structure. Precisely, the ﬁxed eﬀect
estimator is less sensitive against the violation of strict exogeneity of the regressors while the
ﬁrst-diﬀerencing estimator is less sensitive against the violation of serially uncorrelated error
terms. Since we will account for dynamic investment eﬀects as explained below, we will follow
the literature on dynamic investment models and estimate a ﬁrst-diﬀerence model. However, we
equally experimented with ﬁxed eﬀect equations which led to qualitatively equivalent results.
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tion of Anderson and Hsiao (1982) to estimate the model in ﬁrst diﬀerences. We
instrument for the diﬀerenced lag of the dependent capital investment variable
with the level of deeper lags. Because the model is estimated in ﬁrst diﬀerences,
the equation will be characterized by the presence of ﬁrst-order serial correlation.
However, the validity of the estimator relies on the absence of second-order serial
correlation. The test for ﬁrst-order and second-order serial correlation by Arellano
and Bond (1991) will be reported at the bottom of the result tables. The approach
provides a means to derive consistent estimates for dynamic models and to cir-
cumvent the well-known dynamic panel bias in estimation of dynamic ﬁxed eﬀects
models. More precisely, we employ the second and third lag of subsidiary capital
investment to instrument for the ﬁrst lag of the dependent capital investment vari-
able. To test for the relevance of our instrument set, we employ the Kleibergen
and Paap (2006) statistic which requires a rejection of the null hypothesis. More-
over, we test for the validity of the instruments by using a Sargan/Hansen test of
overidentifying restrictions which requires an acceptance of the null hypothesis.11
A major implication of cross-border tax eﬀects on aﬃliate investment concerns
the ﬁscal externality of corporate taxation. If cross-border eﬀects are accounted
for, there are two externalities, namely the proﬁt shifting and the investment
externality (see section 2.3), which may compensate each other. To quantify the
externalities, we will estimate the following equation
Δ log bi,t = α1Δ(τi,t − τhi,t) + α2Δ log ki,t + α3xi,t + α4xhi,t + Δμt + Δυi,t, (15)
whereas bi,t represents subsidiary i’s pre-tax proﬁt at time t. As explained in Sec-
tion 2.3, the proﬁt shifting externality on foreign pre–tax proﬁts (and consequently
the foreign tax base) depends on the tax rate diﬀerence τhi,t−τi,t. Hence, in line
with previous empirical studies (e.g. Devereux, 2007), we interpret α1 to capture
the proﬁt shifting externality. The coeﬃcient α2 measures the eﬀect of the capital
stock ki,t on pre-tax proﬁt which, in turn, is aﬀected by the parent tax rate via the
11The estimation method we follow here, is a generalization of Anderson and Hsiao (1982).
Arellano and Bond (1991) generalize this method by using a more detailed set of moment con-
ditions to derive the appropriate instruments. However, we do not use the Arellano and Bond
GMM estimation since we found the expanded set of instruments from this method to be weak
in some of our estimation equations. Nevertheless, the results from this approach generally lead
to qualitatively equal results.
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investment externality. Thus, taking into account the coeﬃcient estimates α1, α2
and β3 allows us to quantify the two ﬁscal externalities and compare them against
each other. Moreover, the approach controls for ﬁrm and country characteristics
xi,t and xhi,t as deﬁned above.
Again, ﬁrst diﬀerencing accounts for time-constant subsidiary characteristics.
To avoid endogeneity biases requires valid instruments for the subsidiary assets
ki,t. The coeﬃcient estimate for α2 may otherwise be biased due to reverse causal-
ity problems: high proﬁts may equally trigger high capital investment. Therefore,
we again employ an GMM approach based on Anderson and Hsiao (1982). If there
is no serial correlation, lagged ﬁxed assets are not correlated with the diﬀerenced
error term and are therefore valid instruments for the current ﬁxed assets. Addi-
tionally, we include the corporate tax rates at the aﬃliate and parent location as
instruments for aﬃliate ﬁxed assets. To test the validity of these instruments we
again make use of a Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions.12
4 Data, descriptive statistics and results
In this section, we describe the data base, give some descriptive statistics (4.1)
and report the result of the estimation approach outlined above (4.2).
4.1 Data and sample statistics
Our empirical analysis relies on the AMADEUS data base (Bureau van Dijk) which
contains detailed accounting and ﬁrm structure information for 1.6 million corpo-
rations in 38 countries. The data is available from 1995 to 2005, but unbalanced in
structure. Our analysis comprises data on multinational subsidiaries from EU-25
countries whose direct immediate owner equally resides within EU 25 for the years
1995 to 2005. We restrict our sample to subsidiaries which are directly owned by
a foreign parent company with at least 90% of the ownership shares. Apart from
this, we exclude companies for which essential information needed for our analysis
12Following the empirical literature on corporate taxes and aﬃliate productivity, we decided
to estimate a static instead of a dynamic proﬁt equation since corporate proﬁtability is not found
to be (strongly) persistent over time.
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(ﬁxed assets, corporate tax rate at aﬃliate and parent location, parent informa-
tion) is not available and those, for which unconsolidated accounting information
is unavailable.
The ownership information in our data refers to the last reported date which
is the year 2005 for most corporations in our data set. Thus, the ownership infor-
mation has a cross-sectional dimension only. However, in line with previous work
based on the same data, we are not too concerned about this assumption. To the
extent that we are potentially including a few aﬃliates which were not aﬃliated
in earlier years, we are introducing a measurement error that biases our results
towards zero, see Budd et al. (2005), Barba Navaretti et al. (2003).
Matching parent companies to foreign aﬃliates gives an unbalanced panel with
5, 048 aﬃliates and 2, 564 parent corporations over 10 years. In total, our data
contains 23, 438 aﬃliate-year observations. Thus, the accounting information is
available for 4.6 years on average. Table 1 exhibits the country distribution which
is basically consistent with patterns of multinational ﬁrms in Europe. Most of
the parent ﬁrms are concentrated in Western European countries like France, Ger-
many and the United Kingdom. In contrast, many subsidiaries are located in the
European South (Spain and Italy) as well as in new EU member states like the
Czech Republic and Poland.
Since our analysis investigates corporate tax eﬀects on capital investment and
pre-tax proﬁt, we additionally merge data on the statutory corporate tax rates for
EU-25 countries, taken from European Commission (2006), as well as data on the
eﬀective marginal corporate tax rates, taken from Loretz (2008). Data on other
country characteristics like GDP per capita, the population size and the country’s
unemployment rate which serve as proxies for the degree of development, market
size and the economic situation are retrieved from Eurostat.
Basic sample statistics are summarized in Table 2. The average amount of
ﬁxed assets in the sample of our subsidiaries is 64 million US Dollar.13 The average
number of employees is 282 and the average pre-tax proﬁt is calculated with 5.2
million US dollars. Not surprisingly, the corresponding accounting numbers at
13Note that we employ the subsidiaries’ ﬁxed asset stock as dependent variable in our regression
analyses. In the following, we refer to this variable as ﬁxed assets (stock), capital (stock), capital
investment and ﬁxed asset investment interchangeably.
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the parent location are substantially larger. Moreover, 63.7% of the subsidiaries
belong to a parent ﬁrm that owns intangible property. With regard to country
characteristics, the average corporate tax rate at the parent location is 0.34 and
hence slightly higher than the corporate tax rate at the subsidiary location which
is 0.32. This observation is in line with the common perception that headquarters
are mainly located in western European high-tax countries while production is also
undertaken at subsidiaries in Eastern and Southern European countries with lower
corporate tax rates.
4.2 Estimation results
The following section presents our estimation results. Throughout the whole analy-
sis, the unit of observation will be the multinational subsidiary as described in
section 3. All speciﬁcations include a full set of year dummies and robust stan-
dard errors are calculated and displayed below the coeﬃcient estimates in the
result tables. Following our argumentation in the methodology section, we will
ﬁrstly investigate the eﬀect of corporate taxes at the parent location on foreign
subsidiary ﬁxed assets investment. In a second step, we then determine the impact
of parent corporation tax on subsidiary pre-tax proﬁts distinguishing between the
investment and the proﬁt shifting externality.
4.2.1 Baseline results
Table 3 displays the results of the dynamic capital investment model outlined in
section 3. The speciﬁcations regress the subsidiary’s ﬁxed asset investment on the
statutory corporate tax rates at the subsidiary and the parent country. In speci-
ﬁcation (1), we ﬁnd a signiﬁcantly negative eﬀect of both variables, the domestic
and the foreign parent corporate tax rate, on ﬁxed assets. The semi-elasticities
are calculated with −1.4210 and −0.6040 respectively. Speciﬁcation (2) addition-
ally accounts for various country characteristics (GDP per capita, population size
and unemployment rate) at the aﬃliate and parent location to make sure that
our results are not driven by unobserved time-varying factors that are correlated
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with the corporate tax rate and capital investment.14 The inclusion of the addi-
tional country controls slightly increases the coeﬃcient estimates for the tax rate
variables at the subsidiary and the parent location. Speciﬁcation (3) re-estimates
the relationship including a full set of industry-year dummies which does neither
qualitatively nor quantitatively aﬀect our results. Last, in speciﬁcation (4) we add
country-year eﬀects which absorb all country-speciﬁc shocks to the subsidiary in-
cluding the domestic corporate tax eﬀect on subsidiary investment (consequently,
there is no coeﬃcient estimate reported for this eﬀect). The estimated coeﬃcient
for the parent corporate tax slightly drops in size but remains statistically signiﬁ-
cant at the 5% level. It suggests that an increase in the parent tax by 10 percentage
points on average reduces aﬃliate ﬁxed asset investment by 5.6%. Moreover, note
that the test statistics reported at the bottom of the table indicate our estimation
model to be valid. The Kleibergen-Paap statistic rejects the null hypothesis that
the instruments are weak while the Sargan-Hansen statistic does not reject the null
hypothesis that the instruments are exogeneous to the error term. Furthermore,
the Arellano-Bond test indicates the absence of second-order autocorrelation.
4.2.2 Manufacturing ﬁrms and EMTR
In order to reduce the heterogeneity in our sample, we re-estimate our baseline
equation restricting the sample to manufacturing ﬁrms only, see speciﬁcations (1)
and (2) of Table 4. While speciﬁcation (1) controls for industry-year eﬀects and
time-varying country characteristics, speciﬁcation (2) additionally adds a full set of
country-year eﬀects. Interestingly, for manufacturing ﬁrms we ﬁnd a substantially
stronger eﬀect of the parent corporate tax on subsidiary capital investment while
the host country tax is found to exert a slightly weaker inﬂuence than in the overall
sample of ﬁrms. A similar result is derived in speciﬁcation (2).
In speciﬁcations (3) and (4), we reestimate the relation between corporate
taxes and capital investment for the subset of manufacturing ﬁrms employing
the eﬀective marginal corporate tax rate (EMTR) as explanatory variable instead
14All country control variables enter the estimation equation in log form. This speciﬁcation is
chosen since it ﬁts the data slightly better than an inclusion in levels. Note, however, that the
estimated corporate tax coeﬃcient are neither qualitatively nor quantitatively sensitive to the
speciﬁcation of the controls.
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of the statutory corporate tax rate. The EMTR is a summary measure which
includes depreciation allowances for capital goods, which is especially important
in the manufacturing industry. The results for the EMTR estimations for the
subgroup of manufacturing ﬁrms are displayed in columns (3) and (4) of Table 4.
Both the subsidiary and the parent tax rate are conﬁrmed to exert a negative and
signiﬁcant eﬀect on subsidiary capital investment whereas the coeﬃcient estimates
are quantitatively comparable to the results found based on statutory corporate
rate measures (cf. columns (1) and (2)).
4.2.3 Transmission channels
In the theory section, we established three alternative transmission channels through
which taxes at the parent company location may aﬀect subsidiary capital invest-
ment: common inputs, credit constraints and proﬁt shifting.
Firstly, in the common input scenario, taxes on the parent company reduce the
use of the common input and, thus, render capital investments at the subsidiaries
less productive. In order to explore the relevance of this scenario, we split our data
in two group: subsidiaries that belong to parent ﬁrms that hold intangible assets
and subsidiaries that belong to parent ﬁrms that do not hold intangible assets.
From our point of view the ownership of intellectual property is plausibly a good
proxy for whether the parent provides common input goods to its subsidiaries or
not since many public inputs are intangible in nature, see e.g. Markusen (1995)
and Gattai (2005). The results are presented in Table 5 and conﬁrm the role
of common inputs in explaining cross-country tax eﬀects on aﬃliate investment.
Speciﬁcations (1) and (3) show the results for the subsample of ﬁrms that belong
to parents with intangible property. For these ﬁrms, we ﬁnd a strong negative
eﬀect of the parent tax rate on subsidiary capital investment. On average, an in-
crease in the corporate tax rate by 1 percentage point is estimated to lower capital
investment at the subsidiary by 0.84% (speciﬁcation (1)) and 0.76% (speciﬁcation
(3)) respectively. In contrast, speciﬁcations (2) and (4) exhibit regressions for the
subgroup of subsidiaries that belong to parents that do not own intellectual prop-
erty. The results indicate a strong negative impact of the subsidiary’s corporate
tax rate on subsidiary investment whereas - in line with the presumption - the
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parent tax does not exhibit a statistically signiﬁcant inﬂuence.15
Secondly, MNEs may be restricted with respect to borrowing on the capital
market and therefore, their investment volumes depend on the after-tax proﬁt
earned which then may be re-invested in the corporation. Raising the corporate
tax rate at the parent location thus reduces the parents’ after-tax proﬁt and thus
the funds available for investment at the subsidiary. Thus, we would like to split
our sample in sub-groups of ﬁrms that are likely to be credit-constraint and non-
credit-constraint respectively. In this context, empirical studies have shown that
especially small ﬁrms and ﬁrms with a low-proﬁt tend to suﬀer from borrowing
constraints, see Fazzari et al. (1988). Therefore, we divide our sample in two
subgroups of subsidiaries that belong to parent ﬁrms which earn a high and low
pre-tax proﬁt respectively. For this purpose, we determine the median pre-tax
proﬁt of our sample which is slightly above 16 million US dollars. The estimation
results are presented in Table 6. Speciﬁcations (1) and (3) present estimations
for the subsample of subsidiaries that belong to parent ﬁrms with a low pre-tax
proﬁt while speciﬁcations (2) and (4) present estimations for the subsample of
subsidiaries that belong to parent ﬁrms with a high pre-tax proﬁt.16 The results
are in line with our presumptions indicating that subsidiaries which belong to high-
proﬁt parents do not observe eﬀects of the headquarter’s corporate tax rate on its
investment level while the ﬁxed asset investment of subsidiaries which belong to
low-proﬁt parents are strongly aﬀected by changes in the headquarter tax.17
15Strictly speaking, the coeﬃcient estimates for the parent tax variable do not diﬀer in a
statistical sense for the two subgroups of subsidiaries due to rather large standard errors. The
large standard error for the parent tax coeﬃcient estimates in the subgroup of subsidiaries whose
parents do not hold intangible property may be driven by a misclassiﬁcation of some MNEs.
First, parents in the subgroup of no-intangibles holding ﬁrms may nevertheless provide common
input goods or common services to their aﬃliates that are not captured by the balance sheet
item intangible assets. This might refer to e.g. management or administration services. Second,
accounting law generally regulates that if a ﬁrm develops intangible property this might only
be capitalized in the balance sheet at a late production stage, e.g. with the ﬁle of a patent or
alternatively if the intangible property is bought from another ﬁrm. That implies that some
of the no-intangibles holding ﬁrms de facto own intangible property and hence the mechanism
sketched in our theoretical section applies.
16Note that although we split the sample at the median value, the two subsamples must not
necessarily contain the identical number of observation since inclusion in the regression analysis
implies that the ﬁrst to third lag of the capital investment variable to be non-missing to apply the
Anderson and Hsiao (1982)-estimator which is not the case for every observation in our sample.
17We understand these results as an indication that credit constraints play a role in determining
20
Thirdly, the subsidiaries’ investment level may be aﬀected by proﬁt shifting
considerations. The larger the absolute tax rate diﬀerential between a subsidiary
and its parent ﬁrm, the larger are potential proﬁt shifting possibilities. Thus, we
expect the subsidiary’s capital stock to depend positively on the absolute value
of the tax diﬀerence. We re-estimate our dynamic subsidiary investment model
and additionally include the absolute tax rate diﬀerential as explanatory variable.
The results are presented in Table 6. Speciﬁcation (1) includes year dummies and
suggests a strong negative eﬀect of both, the subsidiary corporate tax rate as well
as the parent corporate tax rate, on subsidiary investment. Moreover, in line with
our presumption, increases in the absolute tax rate diﬀerential tend to increase
subsidiary investment although the coeﬃcient estimate does not fully reach sta-
tistical signiﬁcance. Speciﬁcations (2) and (3) additionally include controls for
country characteristics and industry-year dummies respectively which derives sim-
ilar coeﬃcient estimates for our tax variables as in Speciﬁcation (1) whereas the
coeﬃcient estimate of the absolute tax diﬀerence variable gains signiﬁcance at the
5% level. These results may be interpreted as evidence in favor of shifting induced
ﬁxed-asset investment.18
4.2.4 External eﬀects on the foreign tax base
The previous section provided evidence for a negative and signiﬁcant impact of
home country taxes on host country activity. This generates a potentially im-
portant negative externality of domestic tax policy on the foreign country’s tax
revenue and is thus related to another hotly debated question: the ineﬃciencies
caused by the positive proﬁt shifting externality. Following the methodology out-
lined in section 3, we quantify the two externalities against each other.
the observed cross-border tax eﬀects. However, it must also be stressed that the coeﬃcient
estimates for the parent tax variable in the subgroups of high-proﬁt and low-proﬁt ﬁrms are
again not statistically diﬀerent from each other. Moreover, the coeﬃcient estimates in the two
subgroups turn out to be somewhat sensitive against the proﬁt cut-oﬀ values used to deﬁne the
subgroups. In our view, this may again be referred to the somewhat bold deﬁnition of the groups
of credit-constrained and not credit-constrained ﬁrms.
18Note that we do not control for country-year characteristics here as the rather pronounced
correllation between the parent tax rate and the absolute tax rate diﬀerence between subsidiary
and parent country avoids a separate identiﬁcation if we absorb much of the variation in the tax
variables by including country-year eﬀects.
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Table 8 presents several model speciﬁcations. Speciﬁcation (1) regresses the
subsidiaries’ pre-tax proﬁt on ﬁxed asset investment and the tax rate diﬀerential
between the subsidiary and the parent ﬁrm. The tax rate diﬀerential enters with
a negative sign, as expected, the semi-elasticity is estimated with −0.84. Thus,
a larger diﬀerence between the statutory tax rates at the subsidiary and parent
location reduces the MNE’s pre-tax proﬁt. This observation is in line with proﬁt
shifting behavior. The coeﬃcient estimate on ﬁxed assets indicates that an 1% in-
crease in ﬁxed assets raises pre-tax proﬁts by 0.45% on average. Speciﬁcations (2)
and (3) additionally control for time-varying country characteristics and industry-
year dummies respectively. The inclusion of these additional country control vari-
ables leads to a slight drop in the absolute size of both coeﬃcient estimates, the
coeﬃcient for the ﬁxed asset investment as well as the coeﬃcient for the diﬀerence
in statutory tax rates. Speciﬁcation (3) suggests that an 1% increase in ﬁxed asset
investment raises the subsidiary’s pre-tax proﬁt by 0.35% on average and that the
semi-elasticity of pre-tax proﬁt with respect to the tax rate diﬀerential is −0.71
on average.
This allows us to compare the tax base eﬀects caused by the two opposing
externalities presented in the theoretical section of this paper: ﬁrstly, the proﬁt
shifting externality formally captured by the tax rate diﬀerential in the pre-tax
proﬁt equation is quantiﬁed with a semi-elasticity of −0.71 (cf. Table 8, column
(3)); secondly, the negative externality of parent taxes on subsidiary capital invest-
ment is measured with a semi-elasticity of 0.20 = 0.56 · 0.35 (cf. Table 3, column
(4) and Table 8, column (3)). Thus, almost one third of the positive proﬁt shifting
externality on the foreign subsidiary country’s tax base is compensated by the neg-
ative parent tax externality on subsidiary capital investment. This result implies
that if a country decreases its corporate tax rate, it attracts foreign paper proﬁts
and therefore reduces the corporate tax base of foreign countries. However, this
eﬀect is partly mitigated as the corporate tax reduction also implies that capital
investment at foreign subsidiaries is increased which, in turn raises the corporate
tax base of foreign countries.
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5 Discussion and concluding remarks
In this paper, we used a large ﬁrm-level data set to test for cross-border tax eﬀects
within multinational ﬁrms. Our results show that tax increases at the parent
location have a signiﬁcant and robust negative eﬀect on foreign subsidiary capital
stock. We identiﬁed three diﬀerent channels (apart from interest rate eﬀects at the
world capital market) through which these cross-border tax eﬀects may emerge: the
use of common inputs (like patents, trademarks etc.), credit constraints and proﬁt
shifting. We ﬁnd support for the importance of all three transmission channels.
Our ﬁndings are also in line with recent studies showing that, within multi-
national ﬁrms, domestic investment increases in response to foreign investment.
They may even be read as additional indirect evidence for such a complemen-
tary relation. An important question in this literature is whether the observed
positive correlation of investment levels can be interpreted as a causal eﬀect of
foreign investment on domestic capital stocks, or if it is due to some unobservable
eﬀect driving both foreign and domestic investment. By considering tax eﬀects,
we oﬀer a new identiﬁcation strategy. Since it seems plausible to assume that
foreign tax rate changes are exogenous from the viewpoint of the multinational
ﬁrm’s investment behavior, our results support the notion of a causal eﬀect.
Additionally, the paper shows that the derived cross-border tax eﬀect on sub-
sidiary investment gives rise to a so far neglected negative ﬁscal externality on
foreign tax revenues. We contrast this eﬀect with the well-established positive ex-
ternality due to proﬁt shifting and ﬁnd that the shifting externality is considerably
compensated by up to one third. Hence, we conclude that countries are not as
much harmed by tax rate decreases in foreign economies as is usually assumed.
Moreover, we believe that the estimation of one third is a conservative guess for
the following reason. We can (more or less) precisely measure the impact of tax
rate diﬀerences on proﬁts, but there may be more real activity responses to parent
company taxation than we considered here. For example, additional foreign invest-
ment may imply an increase in foreign employment. If an increase in employment
increases welfare (e.g. in the presence of labor taxes, unemployment etc.), the
externality due to cross-border tax eﬀects on capital becomes stronger.
Therefore, we consider the cross-border investment eﬀect to be an important
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counter-balance for the well-known proﬁt shifting externality. As a consequence,
our results may change the perspective from which multinational enterprises are
considered. An often cited view is that multinational ﬁrms, as opposed to nation-
ally operating ﬁrms, accelerate tax competition. Our analysis shows that multi-
national ﬁrms “export” the tax burden on the headquarter to its foreign aﬃliates.
That means, if real economic activity and not accounting proﬁts are concerned, the
existence of multinational ﬁrms may dampen the pressure from tax competition.
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Table 1: Country Statistics
Country Subsidiary Parent
Austria 20 75
Belgium 470 177
Cyprus 0 3
Czech Republic 133 2
Germany 122 366
Denmark 299 185
Estonia 93 6
Spain 465 100
Finland 203 98
France 705 251
United Kingdom 827 397
Greece 51 7
Hungary 63 3
Ireland 155 64
Italy 336 193
Lithuania 10 2
Luxembourg 10 35
Latvia 37 1
Netherlands 322 261
Poland 247 14
Portugal 55 21
Sweden 403 298
Slovenia 2 4
Slovakia 20 1
Sum 5, 048 2, 564
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Subsidiary Level:
Statutory Corporate Tax Rate 23,428 .3249 .0586 .1 .5601
Eﬀective Marginal Tax Rate 23,428 .1134 .0585 -.4350 .4011
Fixed Assets 23,428 64,556.9 724,387.2 1 4.81e+07
Number of Employees 19,448 282.0 1,065.0 1 24,561
Pre-tax Proﬁt 22,490 5158.5 80,093.0 -3,930,011 6,395,743
GDP per Capita 23,428 23,903.3 7,534.7 2,484.6 60,311.2
Population 23,428 3.52e+07 2.42e+07 422,050 8.25e+07
Unemployment Rate 20,625 .0796 .0339 .0210 .1980
Parent Level:
Statutory Corporate Tax Rate 23,428 .3412 .0658 .1 .5601
Eﬀective Marginal Tax Rate 23,428 .1136 .0416 -.4350 .4011
Fixed Assets 12,118 4,423,212 1.20e+07 3 1.36e+08
Number of Employees 10,438 7,465.6 29,432.4 1 323,298
Proﬁt Loss Before Tax 12,133 253,919.3 911,499.5 -1.57e+07 1.15e+07
Intangible Asset Holdings 23,428 .6371 .4808 0 1
GDP per Capita 23,428 27,651.4 5,800.5 2,798.1 65,113.1
Population 23,428 3.83e+07 2.95e+07 422,050 8.25e+07
Unemployment Rate 21,102 .0680 .0247 .0210 .1980
Notes:
 In thousands of US dollars, current prices.
 In euros, current prices.
Table 3: Baseline Estimation
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Lag Fixed Assets 0.6615∗∗∗ 0.7032∗∗∗ 0.6837∗∗∗ 0.6751∗∗∗
(0.0582) (0.0663) (0.0665) (0.0648)
Corporate Tax Rate, Subs −1.4210∗∗∗ −1.6733∗∗∗ −1.6597∗∗∗
(0.3240) (0.3548) (0.3576)
Corporate Tax Rate, Par −0.6040∗∗∗ −0.7056∗∗∗ −0.6363∗∗∗ −0.5596∗∗
(0.2453) (0.2740) (0.2791) (0.2854)
GDP p.c., Subs 0.3157 0.4589
(0.3424) (0.3450)
GDP p.c., Par −0.1239 −0.1477 −0.2991
(0.4155) (0.4161) (0.4217)
Population, Subs 0.5980 0.8546
(0.9889) (1.0004)
Population, Par 1.1283 0.9616 1.4911
(1.2570) (1.2546) (1.2550)
Unemployment Rate, Subs 0.0543 0.0693
(0.0676) (0.0667)
Unemployment Rate, Par −0.0169 −0.0359 −0.0411
(0.0687) (0.0688) (0.0675)
Industry - Year Dummies
√ √
Country - Year Dummies
√
Number of Observations 23, 428 20, 604 20, 203 20, 701
Number of Aﬃliates 5, 048 4, 743 4, 644 4, 773
Kleibergen-Paap Statistic 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Sargan-Hansen Statistic 0.549 0.506 0.407 0.409
Arellano-Bond, AR(1) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Arellano-Bond, AR(2) 0.461 0.273 0.318 0.282
Dependent variable: log of subsidiary ﬁxed assets. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
∗∗∗ / ∗∗ / ∗ indicates statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% / 5% / 10% level. / indicates that
the p-value/z-value is reported. Speciﬁcations (1) and (2) includes a full set of year eﬀects.
‘Corporate Tax Rate’ stands for the statutory corporate tax rate, ‘GDP p.c.’ for the log of GDP
per capita, ‘Population’ for the log of population size and ’Unemployment Rate’ for the log of the
unemployment rate. ’Subs’ indicates the subsidiary, ’Par’ the parent ﬁrm. At the bottom of the
table the Kleibergen-Paap test for weak instruments, the Sargan-Hansen test of overidentifying
restrictions and the Arellano-Bond test for ﬁrst and second-order autocorrellation is reported.
Table 4: Manufacturing Firms and EMTR
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Lag Fixed Assets 0.6329∗∗∗ 0.6441∗∗∗ 0.6152∗∗∗ 0.6362∗∗∗
(0.0981) (0.0926) (0.0983) (0.0924)
Corporate Tax Rate, Subs −0.9705∗∗∗ −1.0307∗∗
(0.3910) (0.4447)
Corporate Tax Rate, Par −1.4484∗∗∗ −1.3401∗∗∗ −1.7085∗∗∗ −1.6503∗∗∗
(0.4423) (0.4466) (0.5656) (0.5703)
GDP p.c., Subs 0.4203 0.5928
(0.4961) (0.4956)
GDP p.c., Par 0.1219 0.1758 0.1105 0.1378
(0.6159) (0.6425) (0.6139) (0.6410)
Population, Subs −1.7942 −2.3259
(1.6317) (1.5930)
Population, Par 2.7470 2.9684 1.7027 1.9761
(1.9031) (1.9296) (1.8537) (1.8884)
Unemployment Rate, Subs 0.0784 0.1259
(0.0855) (0.0869)
Unemployment Rate, Par −0.1439 −0.0994 −0.0963 −0.0577
(0.1039) (0.1025) (0.1026) (0.1020)
Country - Year Dummies
√ √
EMTR
√ √
Number of Observations 6, 258 6, 382 6, 258 6, 382
Number of Aﬃliates 1, 315 1, 348 1, 315 1, 348
Kleibergen-Paap Statistic 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Sargan-Hansen Statistic 0.996 0.926 0.982 0.943
Arellano-Bond, AR(1) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Arellano-Bond, AR(2) 0.506 0.409 0.512 0.415
Dependent variable: log of subsidiary ﬁxed assets. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
∗∗∗ / ∗∗ / ∗ indicates statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% / 5% / 10% level. / indicates that the p-
value/z-value is reported. All speciﬁcations include a full set of industry-year eﬀects. ‘Corporate
Tax Rate’ stands for the statutory corporate tax rate (Speciﬁcations (1) and (2)) and for the
eﬀective marginal tax rate (Speciﬁcations (3) and (4)) respectively, ‘GDP p.c.’ for the log of
GDP per capita, ‘Population’ for the log of population size and ’Unemployment Rate’ for the
log of the unemployment rate. ’Subs’ indicates the subsidiary, ’Par’ the parent ﬁrm. At the
bottom of the table the Kleibergen-Paap test for weak instruments, the Sargan-Hansen test of
overidentifying restrictions and the Arellano-Bond test for ﬁrst and second-order autocorrellation
is reported.
Table 5: Intangibles Holdings vs. No Intangibles Holdings at Parent
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Lag Fixed Assets 0.7611∗∗∗ 0.6070∗∗∗ 0.7533∗∗∗ 0.5813∗∗∗
(0.1042) (0.0997) (0.1021) (0.0948)
Corporate Tax Rate, Subs −0.8497∗∗∗ −3.1446∗∗∗
(0.4061) (0.7017)
Corporate Tax Rate, Par −0.8425∗∗∗ −0.2284 −0.7580∗∗ −0.3363
(0.3533) (0.4553) (0.3618) (0.4728)
GDP p.c., Subs 0.6122 0.2333
0.4347 (0.5955)
GDP p.c., Par −0.0714 0.2327 −0.4953 0.3274
(0.5897) (0.6987) (0.5939) (0.7167)
Population, Subs −0.4599 3.1009
(1.1988) (2.1561)
Population, Par 2.6178∗ −2.1499 3.2962∗∗ −1.2032
(1.5155) (2.6626) (1.5425) (2.7336)
Unemployment Rate, Subs 0.0950 0.0209
(0.0854) (0.1119)
Unemployment Rate, Par 0.0715 −0.1333 0.0379 −0.1327
(0.0884) (0.1291) (0.0876) (0.1272)
Country - Year Dummies
√ √
Subgroup Intangibles No Intangibles Intangibles No Intangibles
Number of Observations 12, 943 7, 260 13, 280 7, 421
Number of Aﬃliates 3, 479 2, 307 3, 573 2, 355
Kleibergen-Paap Statistic 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Sargan-Hansen Statistic 0.528 0.585 0.472 0.591
Arellano-Bond, AR(1) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Arellano-Bond, AR(2) 0.501 0.787 0.520 0.784
Dependent variable: log of subsidiary ﬁxed assets. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
∗∗∗ / ∗∗ / ∗ indicates statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% / 5% / 10% level. / indicates that
the p-value/z-value is reported. All speciﬁcations include a full set of industry-year eﬀects.
‘Corporate Tax Rate’ stands for the statutory corporate tax rate, ‘GDP p.c.’ for the log of GDP
per capita, ‘Population’ for the log of population size and ’Unemployment Rate’ for the log of the
unemployment rate. ’Subs’ indicates the subsidiary, ’Par’ the parent ﬁrm. At the bottom of the
table the Kleibergen-Paap test for weak instruments, the Sargan-Hansen test of overidentifying
restrictions and the Arellano-Bond test for ﬁrst and second-order autocorrellation is reported.
Table 6: Low Profits vs. High Profits at Parent Firm
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Lag Fixed Assets 0.9409∗∗∗ 0.4295∗∗∗ 0.9423∗∗∗ 0.4181∗∗∗
(0.1637) (0.1249) (0.1560) (0.1295)
Corporate Tax Rate, Subs −1.6174∗∗∗ −1.5076∗∗
(0.5765) (0.5747)
Corporate Tax Rate, Par −1.0603∗∗∗ −0.5916 −1.0105∗ −0.4107
(0.5244) (0.4598) (0.5299) (0.4693)
GDP p.c., Subs 0.3274 0.7584
0.6623 (0.5921)
GDP p.c., Par −2.0764∗∗ 0.0276 −2.4560 0.0826
(0.9779) (0.8276) (1.0271) (0.8210)
Population, Subs −5.2836 1.1489
(2.4767) (1.6660)
Population, Par 4.7528 −1.0243 3.5919 −0.9886
(3.0781) (2.6759) (3.2705) (2.6244)
Unemployment Rate, Subs −0.0263 0.2872∗∗
(0.1540) (0.1220)
Unemployment Rate, Par 0.1494 −0.0046 −0.0367 −0.0388
(0.1900) (0.1838) (0.2025) (0.1776)
Country - Year Dummies
√ √
Subgroup Low Proﬁt High Proﬁt Low Proﬁt High Proﬁt
Number of Observations 5, 379 5, 295 5, 493 7, 421
Number of Aﬃliates 1, 794 1, 593 1, 835 2, 355
Kleibergen-Paap Statistic 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Sargan-Hansen Statistic 0.542 0.405 0.434 0.317
Arellano-Bond, AR(1) 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.008
Arellano-Bond, AR(2) 0.982 0.630 0.757 0.610
Dependent variable: log of subsidiary ﬁxed assets. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
∗∗∗ / ∗∗ / ∗ indicates statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% / 5% / 10% level. / indicates that
the p-value/z-value is reported. All speciﬁcations include a full set of industry-year eﬀects.
‘Corporate Tax Rate’ stands for the statutory corporate tax rate, ‘GDP p.c.’ for the log of GDP
per capita, ‘Population’ for the log of population size and ’Unemployment Rate’ for the log of the
unemployment rate. ’Subs’ indicates the subsidiary, ’Par’ the parent ﬁrm. At the bottom of the
table the Kleibergen-Paap test for weak instruments, the Sargan-Hansen test of overidentifying
restrictions and the Arellano-Bond test for ﬁrst and second-order autocorrellation is reported.
Table 7: Profit Shifting and Investment
Variable (1) (2) (3)
Fixed Assets, Lag 1 0.6614∗∗∗ 0.7041∗∗∗ 0.6848∗∗∗
(0.0582) (0.0664) (0.0666)
Corporate Tax Rate, Subs −1.4178∗∗∗ −1.7049∗∗∗ −1.6869∗∗∗
(0.3246) (0.3505) (0.3538)
Corporate Tax Rate, Par −0.9161∗∗∗ −1.2186∗∗∗ −1.1219∗∗∗
(0.3264) (0.3645) (0.3684)
Absolute Tax Diﬀerence 0.4235 0.6397∗∗ 0.6027∗∗
(0.2880) (0.3088) (0.3094)
GDP per Capita, Subs 0.2258 0.3723
(0.3461) (0.3490)
GDP per Capita, Par −0.1061 −0.1316
(0.4155) (0.4160)
Population, Subs 0.8066 1.0467
(0.9926) (1.0035)
Population, Par 1.1700 1.0028
(1.2615) (1.2587) )
Unemployment Rate, Subs 0.0566 0.0710
(0.0676) (0.0668)
Unemployment Rate, Par −0.0211 −0.0400
(0.0687) (0.0688)
Industry - Year Dummies
√
Number of Observations 23, 428 20, 604 20, 203
Number of Aﬃliates 5, 048 4, 743 4, 644
Kleibergen-Paap Statistic 0.000 0.000 0.000
Sargan-Hansen Statistic 0.543 0.501 0.404
Arellano-Bond, AR(1) 0.000 0.006 0.000
Arellano-Bond, AR(2) 0.455 0.630 0.310
Dependent variable: log of subsidiary ﬁxed assets. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
∗∗∗ / ∗∗ / ∗ indicates statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% / 5% / 10% level. / indicates that
the p-value/z-value is reported. Speciﬁcations (1) and (2) include a full set of year eﬀects.
‘Corporate Tax Rate’ stands for the statutory corporate tax rate, ‘Absolute Tax Diﬀerence’ for
the absolute diﬀerence between the subsidiary’s and the parent ﬁrm’s statutory corporate tax
rate. ‘GDP p.c.’ indicates the log of GDP per capita, ‘Population’ the log of population size
and ’Unemployment Rate’ the log of the unemployment rate. ’Subs’ indicates the subsidiary,
’Par’ the parent ﬁrm. At the bottom of the table the Kleibergen-Paap test for weak instruments,
the Sargan-Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions and the Arellano-Bond test for ﬁrst and
second-order autocorrellation is reported.
Table 8: Profit Estimation
Variable (1) (2) (3)
Fixed Asset Investment 0.4513∗∗∗ 0.3781∗∗∗ 0.3533∗∗∗
(0.1333) (0.1386) (0.1361)
Tax Diﬀerence −0.8406∗∗∗ −0.7347∗∗∗ −0.7057∗∗
(0.2857) (0.3021) (0.3108)
GDP per Capita, Subs 2.5256∗∗∗ 2.4824∗∗∗
(0.5590) (0.5663)
GDP per Capita, Par 0.9363 0.8500
(0.6926) (0.7015)
Population, Subs −2.8574∗ −3.2446∗
(1.6973) (1.7218)
Population, Par −0.0557 0.2004
(2.5025) (2.5054)
Unemployment Rate, Subs 0.0564 0.0338
(0.1145) (0.1166)
Unemployment Rate, Par 0.0680 0.0528
(0.1066) (0.1077)
Industry - Year Dummies
√
Number of Observations 17, 199 15, 262 14, 971
Number of Aﬃliates 4, 262 3, 985 3, 905
Kleibergen-Paap Statistic 0.000 0.000 0.000
Sargan-Hansen Statistic 0.135 0.243 0.305
Dependent variable: logarithm of subsidiary pre-tax proﬁt. Robust standard errors in paren-
theses. ∗∗∗ / ∗∗ / ∗ indicates statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% / 5% / 10% level.  indicates that
the p-value is reported. Speciﬁcations (1) and (2) include a full set of year eﬀects. ‘Fixed Asset
Investment’ stands for the logarithm of ﬁxed assets at the subsidiary, ‘Tax Diﬀerence’ for the
diﬀerence between the statutory corporate tax rate at the subsidiary and at the parent location.
‘GDP p.c.’ indicates the log of GDP per capita, ‘Population’ the log of population size and
’Unemployment Rate’ the log of the unemployment rate. ’Subs’ indicates the subsidiary, ’Par’
the parent ﬁrm. At the bottom of the table the Sargan-Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions
and the Kleibergen-Paap test for weak instruments is reported.
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